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  The state makes no argument that its “state actor” analysis applies under1
the Idaho Constitution.  Mr. Kubat pled his claim under both the state and federal
constitutions.  R 10.  See Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 40-41, 785 P.2d 163, 165-66
(1989), holding that the parameters of Idaho Constitution Art. 1, § 13 are not
necessarily bound by the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment applied by
the United States Supreme Court.  
  This was the claim heard in the evidentiary hearing and decided by the2
district court.  “At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel clarified that the claim was not
one for ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather was based upon a direct
constitutional violation - the deprivation of his right to testify in his own behalf.”  R
161.  The state never disputed that this was the claim before the court.  EH Tr. p. 4,
ln. 12-20.  See IRCP 15(b)(1) regarding issues tried by express or implied consent. 
See also, Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 708, 274 P.3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2012),
reviewing Rossignol’s claim as a direct constitutional claim as well as an ineffective
assistance claim as the claim was tried at the prompting of the court as both even
though it was initially pled as only an ineffective assistance claim. 
1
II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.  The State’s “State Actor” Analysis is Inapplicable to this Case
The state argues that because trial counsel was not a “state actor” the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply and thus Mr. Kubat is not entitled to post-
conviction relief.  Respondent’s Brief pp. 4-11.   This argument is a red herring. 1
Whether trial counsel was a state actor has nothing to do with the issue before this
Court: whether the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief because Mr.
Kubat presented proof by a preponderance that he was never properly advised that
the decision of whether to testify was his to make, that had he known this he would
have exercised that right, and as a result he was denied his constitutional right.   2
State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985), recognized that
criminal defendants have a fundamental constitutional right to testify in their own
2defense.  The Court held that the relevant question is whether the constitutional
right to testify was infringed upon when Darbin was not called to testify at trial. 
Id. at 522-23, 708 P.2d at 927-28.  The Court did not hold that the constitutional
right to testify could be denied by trial counsel but that there could be no relief
because trial counsel was not a state actor. 
Two years after Darbin, the United States Supreme Court articulated the
contours of the fundamental right in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704
(1987).  Citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533,
n. 15 (1975), Rock held that the right to testify on one’s own behalf in a criminal
trial is “essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.”  483 U.S. at 51,
107 S.Ct. at 2708-09.  The Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment secures
the right of a criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying.   Id.  The
Court further noted that the right is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause of
the Sixth Amendment which applies to the states through the Fourteenth.  Id. at
52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709. 
A person’s right to reasonable notice of the charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense – a right to his day in court – are
basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.  
Id. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 2709, quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499,
507 (1948) (emphasis original). 
State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 778 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1989), applied the
3right as articulated in Rock to Hoffman’s assertion that his attorney prevented him
from testifying.  The Court of Appeals did not engage in the analysis forwarded by
the state in this case - an examination of whether counsel was a state actor. 
Rather, the Court stated: 
The defendant personally is vested with the ultimate authority to
decide whether or not to testify.  Counsel may advise the defendant
regarding the wisdom and propriety of testifying; but counsel must
abide by the defendant’s eventual decision. 
116 Idaho at 690, 778 P.2d at 812 (citations omitted). 
The Court looked to whether Hoffman had waived his right to testify noting
that “a defendant may be deemed to have waived his right to testify where it is clear
that the defendant was aware of such right, and he acquiesces in his trial counsel’s
statement that he will not testify.”  Id. at 691, 778 P.2d at 813 (emphasis original,
internal quotation omitted).  The Court concluded that the record failed to support a
finding that Hoffman had validly waived his right to testify: Hoffman stated that he
discontinued his insistence on testifying because he thought it was the attorney’s
decision to make; Hoffman’s attorney did not claim that Hoffman had been advised
or was otherwise aware of his ultimate right to decide; and it did not appear that
the district judge at any stage of the trial informed Hoffman that he could testify if
he so desired.  Id. at 692, 778 P.2d at 814. 
Similarly in Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1996),
Cootz claimed that he was deprived of his constitutional right to testify.  The Court
found that the record did not demonstrate that Cootz knew of his ultimate right to
4testify – the prerequisite to finding that he had waived the right.  Therefore, relief
was due unless the deprivation of the right to testify was harmless.  Id. at 358-59,
924 P.2d at 630-31. 
 In DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2009), the
Supreme Court vacated the dismissal of the claim that DeRushé was denied his
constitutional right to testify because he “alleged admissible facts showing that his
counsel denied him the right to testify in his own behalf.”  Again, the Court looked
only to whether the defendant made a valid waiver of his right, not to whether
defense counsel was an agent of the state.  
And, in Rossignol v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the
petitioner had knowingly waived his right to testify, not whether trial counsel was a
“state actor” and thus could not have deprived petitioner of his right to testify. 
The state has not discussed how its proposed Fourteenth Amendment
analysis is contrary to the law as it now exists or explained why the prior case law
should be overruled.  The state has not cited this Court to a single case, from Idaho
or any other jurisdiction, which has adopted its proposed analysis.  
  Instead, the state cites State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 85, 383 P.3d 1249,
1255 (2016), for the proposition that “[b]ecause Kubat’s trial counsel was not a
‘state actor,’ his conduct could not have violated Kubat’s Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process right to testify at trial.”  Respondent’s Brief p. 5.  Sepulveda did not
make any Fourteenth Amendment analysis regarding the state’s theory of “state
actor.”  Rather, the question before the Supreme Court was whether Sepulveda’s
5right to present a defense was violated when the magistrate court sustained an 
objection to defense counsel’s question about a individual’s prior methamphetamine
use and the cause of that individual’s death.  The Supreme Court declined to
consider the question about prior methamphetamine use because the issue was not
raised below.  It further found that evidence regarding the cause of death and its
exclusion did not violate the constitution, concluding “If evidence is not relevant,
the defendant has no constitutional right to present it.”  State v. Sepulveda, 161
Idaho at 79, 383 P.3d at 1256. 
The state also looks to State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905, 911
(Ct. App. 1999), for support of its “state actor” analysis.  Respondent’s Brief pp. 6-7. 
Gilpin argued that St. Alphonsus Medical Center violated her constitutional right to
due process by not maintaining a sufficient chain of custody regarding her blood
tests which were to be introduced against her in an involuntary manslaughter case. 
The Court of Appeals held that private entities do not become an instrument of the
state in every prosecution where the private entity conducts testing for medical
purposes and the test results are later used in a criminal prosecution.  Gilpin does
not hold that a petitioner cannot raise a claim of violation of his right to testify
based upon no evidence of a valid waiver of the right because his attorney was not a
state actor. 
Based upon Sepulveda and Gilpin, the state asks this Court to conclude that
post-conviction relief is not available for defendants who did not validly waive their
rights to testify because their attorneys are not “state actors” and the Fourteenth
6Amendment does not apply.  Even ignoring that Sepulveda and Gilpin do not
actually support this proposition, this proposition should be rejected.  Extending the
state’s proposition, no defendant could ever raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in post-conviction, because defense counsel is not a “state actor” and
therefore the defendant has no Fourteenth Amendment right to competent
representation.  This is nonsense – clearly, petitioners can and do claim ineffective
assistance of counsel in post-conviction and those claims are granted when counsel
has been ineffective.  
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963), holds that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process to defendants in state court.  Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), holds that this due process right includes a right to
effective assistance of counsel.  Ineffective assistance violates the constitution –
even though, in the state’s analysis, defense counsel is not a “state actor.”  And, this
is the state of the law - notwithstanding Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102
S.Ct. 445 (1981), cited by the state at page 7 of its brief.  Polk followed Gideon and
preceded Strickland.  It held that a public defender was not acting under color of
state law for purposes of a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action when she moved to withdraw
in a frivolous case.  It did not hold that because a public defender is not a “state
agent” the defender’s clients do not have a constitutional right to effective
representation or to testify.  Strickland establishes that defendant’s constitutional
  In footnote 2 on page 9 of its brief, the state cites U.S. v. Swisher, 790 F.3
Supp. 2d 1215, 1231-32 (D. Idaho 2011), aff’d, 771 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2014), and
aff’d, 585 Fed. Appx. 605 (9  Cir. 2014) (unpublished), on reh’g en banc, 811 F.3dth
299 (9  Cir. 2016), and rev’d on other grounds, 811 F.3d 299 (9  Cir. 2016), for itsth th
statement that if a defendant remains silent in the face of his attorney’s decision
not to call him as a witness he has waived the right to testify.  
There is a split in the circuits on this.  “At trial defendants generally must
speak only through counsel, and absent something in the record suggesting a
knowing waiver, silence alone cannot support an inference of such a waiver.” 
Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001).  See also, Owens v. United
States, 483 F.3d 48, 58 (1  Cir. 2007); United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 499, 455st
(5  Cir. 2002); United States v. Ortiz, 317 U.S. App. D.C. 262, 82 F.3d 1066, 10071th
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7  Cir. 1991); Unitedth
States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759-60 (11  Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 953th
F.3d 1525 (11  Cir. 1992) (en banc).th
7
rights can be violated by counsel regardless of any claims that counsel is not a state
actor. 
This Court should reject the state’s “state actor” analysis.
B.  The State’s Alternative Argument that Mr. Kubat Did Not Carry the
Burden of Proof on his Constitutional Claim is Contrary to the Record
The crux of the state’s alternative argument is “Neither Kubat nor his trial
counsel could recall whether counsel specifically advised Kubat that he had an
absolute right to testify at trial.  Therefore, Kubat failed to prove he was not so
advised.”  Respondent’s Brief p. 11.  This argument is contrary to the record.
As noted by the state, a defendant may not be found to have waived the right
to testify unless he was aware he had the right and the ultimate authority to decide
whether to testify regardless of counsel’s advice.  Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho at
709, 274 P.3d at 10.  Respondent’s Brief p. 10.    3
The state offers no argument as to why Rossignol should be overruled and the
analysis of Swisher should be adopted.  And, given that in Idaho, as in the federal
courts, defendants generally must speak only through counsel, Rossignol should not
be overruled.  See State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, n. 1, 61 P.3d 632, 635, n. 1 (Ct.
App. 2002), noting that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a right to hybrid
representation.  
8
As set out in the Opening Brief, Mr. Kubat testified that he could not recall
either counsel or the court informing him that he had the ultimate right to testify. 
While the state takes this response to mean that Mr. Kubat might have been
advised, but simply could not remember, that was not the import of Mr. Kubat’s
testimony.  When asked whether he would have testified if he had known of his
constitutional right, Mr. Kubat stated, “I wanted to testify.”  EH Tr. p. 9, ln. 6-13. 
And, counsel, when asked whether he advised Mr. Kubat that it’s ultimately his
right to decide whether to testify, replied: 
I don’t recall using those words.  I don’t know that we ever had any
discussions, you know, now before, we make this decision, you have to
understand you have the right to testify or something to that effect. 
. . . 
I didn’t make a speech to that effect, no. 
EH Tr. p. 20, ln. 16-21.  Again, the testimony was that Mr. Gatewood did not advise
Mr. Kubat that the decision of whether to testify was ultimately his to make – it
was not as the state implies that Mr. Gatewood could not remember what he said
and might have properly advised his client. 
  The state notes in footnote 3 of its brief, Respondent’s Brief p. 10, that Mr.4
“Kubat appears to have initialed a provision in his Guilty Plea Advisory which
informed him of his right to testify[.]” While the advisory does state that defendants
have a right to testify, the advisory does not explain that the decision of whether to
exercise that right lies with the defendant or with counsel.  Thus, the form does not
prove that Mr. Kubat was aware that the decision was his to make.  Had the state
wished to rebut Mr. Kubat’s evidence, it could have cross-examined him, but it
chose not to and must live with the consequences of that decision.  
9
The state presented no evidence to contradict this evidence.  EH Tr.  4
The district court’s memorandum opinion accurately reflects this record.  The
court concluded that Mr. Gatewood advised Mr. Kubat not to testify and there was
no evidence that Mr. Kubat asked to testify.  R 162.  The court did not find that Mr.
Kubat was ever advised of his right to make the ultimate decision on whether to
testify, undoubtedly because the record did not support such a finding.  R 160-62. 
Mr. Kubat carried his burden of proving by a preponderance that he was not
advised that he had the ultimate decision as to whether to testify.  Thus, unless the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, post-conviction relief must be
granted.  State v. Hoffman, supra; Cootz v. State, supra; DeRushé v. State, supra;
Rossignol v. State, supra.
Although the state offered no evidence or argument in the district court to
carry its burden of proving the constitutional error harmless as required by State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
87 S.Ct. 824 (1967), the state now argues that any error was harmless. 
Respondent’s Brief pp. 11-20.  
Mr. Kubat has set out in his Opening Brief why the state failed to carry its
10
burden of proof.  Appellant’s Opening Brief pp. 12-13.  In response, the state has
reiterated the evidence presented at trial.  Respondent’s Brief pp. 12-19.  The state
has then switched the burden of proof arguing that the error was harmless because
Mr. Kubat did not testify at the evidentiary hearing as to what he would have
testified to at trial.  Respondent’s Brief pp. 19-20.  The state, not Mr. Kubat, had
the burden to prove what that unheard testimony would have been.  Chapman,
supra. The state had ample opportunity to present that testimony as Mr. Kubat
testified at the evidentiary hearing and was subject to cross-examination by the
state.  Having forgone its opportunity to present evidence of harmlessness, the state
cannot now argue based upon evidence it failed to present, that the constitutional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
III.  CONCLUSION
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Kubat did not prove
constitutional error by a preponderance.  And, the state did not carry its burden of
proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, this Court should
reverse the order denying post-conviction relief and remand with instructions to
grant relief. 
Respectfully submitted this 3  day of April, 2017.rd
 /s/Deborah Whipple                        
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Corey Kubat
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